Lesson 1.4 · Unit 1 · CA HSS 10.1.2
When does obedience end?
If a ruler is bound by a law he did not make, the obvious next question is what follows when he breaks it. Answering that took far longer than establishing the limit, because every available answer is dangerous, and the danger is the reason the question is interesting.
- Aristotle distinguishes rule by law from tyranny by whose interest is served: a king rules for the common good, a tyrant for himself.
- The classical test is purpose, not procedure. A ruler who came to power lawfully can still be a tyrant, which means legitimacy is about how power is used rather than only how it was obtained.
- Medieval thinkers added the distinction between a tyrant by conduct, who rules badly, and a tyrant by origin, who seized power with no title at all.
- Resistance theory developed slowly, because the obvious objection is that any rebel will claim the ruler is a tyrant.
- The standard safeguard was to require that resistance be led by lesser magistrates rather than by private individuals, which limits who may judge.
- The problem is unsolved, not solved. Every theory of legitimate resistance has to answer who decides, and none answers it fully.
- This is the direct ancestor of Locke, whose breach of trust argument in unit 2 is the same structure with a contract in place of the common good.
Where students lose marks: treating the right of resistance as an obvious good. State the objection that made serious thinkers cautious: a doctrine that licenses rebellion against injustice also licenses rebellion by anyone who claims injustice, and no theory in this unit fully answers it.
The source. Aristotle, Politics, Books III and V, in Benjamin Jowett's 1885 translation. Public domain.
Of forms of government in which one rules, we call that which regards the common interests, kingship or royalty; that which regards the interests of the wealthy few, aristocracy; and when the multitude administer the state for the common interest, the government is called by the generic name, a constitution.
Of the above-mentioned forms, the perversions are as follows: of royalty, tyranny; of aristocracy, oligarchy; of constitutional government, democracy. For tyranny is a kind of monarchy which has in view the interest of the monarch only; oligarchy has in view the interest of the wealthy; democracy, of the needy: none of them the common good of all.
Step one: extract the classification, because it is the engine of the argument. Three forms by number of rulers, each with a good and a corrupt version. One ruler: kingship or tyranny. Few rulers: aristocracy or oligarchy. Many rulers: constitution or democracy.
Step two: identify the criterion that separates the pairs. Not the number of rulers, since that is the same within each pair. The criterion is whose interest is served: the common interest in the good version, a sectional interest in the corrupt one.
Step three: notice how radical that is. Legitimacy turns on purpose rather than on procedure. A king who inherited lawfully and observes every formality is a tyrant if he rules for himself, and the title, the ceremony and the succession do not protect him from the classification.
Step four: notice which word Aristotle uses for a corrupt form. Democracy is listed as the perversion of constitutional government, because he understands it as rule by the poor in their own interest rather than in the common interest. The modern positive sense is much later, and a student who reads "democracy" here as praise has misread the passage.
Step five: derive the practical question the classification creates. If a lawful king can be a tyrant, and if a tyrant rules illegitimately, then obedience is owed to a legitimate ruler and something less is owed to a tyrant. Aristotle does not draw that conclusion, and it follows from his premises, which is why later writers drew it.
Step six: state the objection that made everyone cautious. Whose judgment determines that the common interest is not being served? Any rebel will say so, and any losing faction can describe its defeat as tyranny. A doctrine of legitimate resistance with no test for who applies it licenses permanent civil war.
Step seven: examine the safeguard that was actually adopted. The common medieval and early modern answer was that resistance must be led by lesser magistrates, officials who already hold public authority, rather than by private persons.
It is a real answer: it restricts the judgment to those with a public role and a stake in order. It is also incomplete, since a magistrate can be as self-interested as anyone, and it offers nothing to a population whose magistrates all side with the ruler.
Step eight: connect forward. Locke's version in unit 2 replaces the common good with a trust: government holds power on the people's behalf and forfeits it by breach. The structure is identical to Aristotle's and the vocabulary is legal rather than teleological. Locke faces exactly the same unanswered question about who judges the breach, and the French Revolution supplies a practical demonstration of the difficulty.
Questions 1 to 5 are recall. Questions 6 to 10 ask for reasoning.
- Give Aristotle's three good forms of government.
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Kingship, aristocracy, and constitutional government
- Give the corresponding corrupt forms.
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Tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy
- What criterion separates a good form from its perversion?
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Whether the common interest or a sectional interest is served
- Distinguish a tyrant by conduct from a tyrant by origin.
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By conduct rules badly though lawfully titled; by origin seized power with no title
- What safeguard did later thinkers place on the right of resistance?
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That it be led by lesser magistrates rather than private individuals
- Why is judging legitimacy by purpose rather than procedure a radical move?
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Because it strips away every formal protection a ruler has. A king who inherited lawfully, was crowned properly and observes all the procedures is still classified as a tyrant if he governs in his own interest, so title and ceremony provide no defense. Legitimacy becomes a question about how power is used, which can be assessed by anyone observing the government, rather than a question about how it was acquired, which only the record can settle. Lawful acquisition stops being a defense, since only the purpose counts
- Why does Aristotle list democracy as a corrupt form?
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Because he defines it as rule by the poor in their own interest rather than in the common interest, making it the perversion of constitutional government exactly as oligarchy is the perversion of aristocracy. The classification is consistent: each corrupt form serves a section rather than the whole. The modern approving sense of the word arrives much later, and reading the passage with that sense makes Aristotle look confused when he is being systematic. He defines it as rule by the poor for themselves, not for the common good
- What conclusion follows from Aristotle's premises that he does not draw?
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That obedience is owed to a legitimate ruler and something less than full obedience is owed to a tyrant. If legitimacy depends on serving the common interest, and a tyrant by definition does not, then the tyrant's claim on the subject is weakened. The classification makes the conclusion available without stating it, which is why later writers could develop resistance theory while citing him, and it illustrates how a framework can have consequences its author did not pursue. That obedience to a tyrant is not fully owed
- State the strongest objection to any right of resistance.
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That it requires someone to judge whether the common interest is being served, and every rebel will answer yes while every losing faction can call its defeat tyranny. A doctrine licensing resistance to injustice therefore also licenses resistance by anyone who merely claims injustice, with no way to tell the cases apart in advance. Taken seriously, it threatens permanent civil war, and that danger rather than deference to kings is why careful thinkers hedged the doctrine so heavily. Anyone can claim tyranny, so the doctrine risks permanent rebellion
- Evaluate the lesser magistrates safeguard.
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It genuinely narrows the problem by restricting judgment to people who already hold public authority and have a stake in order, which excludes the merely aggrieved individual. But it does not solve it. A magistrate can be as self-interested as anyone and may resist for private advantage, and the safeguard leaves a population with no remedy at all when every magistrate sides with the ruler. It converts an unlimited license into a limited one without establishing that the limit is drawn in the right place. It narrows who may judge without ensuring they judge well, and abandons those whose magistrates are complicit