The cap would produce a shortage of 23,000 units, would benefit 31,000 existing tenants
substantially, and would leave 23,000 households worse off than under the current market,
including most of the lower-income workers the policy names as its beneficiaries. I would
recommend against it in this form, and recommend instead a combination of targeted
subsidy and supply measures, while acknowledging that the alternative is slower and the
problem is immediate.
Start with the arithmetic. Equilibrium is at 1,150 dollars, where 45,000 units are
demanded and supplied. At the proposed cap of 900, quantity demanded rises to 54,000 and
quantity supplied falls to 31,000. The shortage is 23,000 units, and it is worth breaking
into its two halves because they behave differently.
Demand rose by 9,000, from 45,000 to 54,000, as the lower rent attracts households who
would not have sought a unit at 1,150. Supply fell by 14,000, from 45,000 to 31,000, as
owners convert units to other uses, sell to owner-occupiers, or withdraw them. The supply
half is larger, and it is the half that worsens over time as buildings age and are not
maintained or replaced.
Now name the winners and losers, which the proposal does not do. The 31,000 tenants who
hold a unit save 250 dollars a month, or 3,000 a year, which against a median renter
income of 42,000 is a gain of about 7 percent of income. That is a substantial and real
benefit to real households and should not be minimized.
The losers are the 14,000 households that would have been housed at 1,150 and now are
not, plus the 9,000 additional seekers drawn in who also go without. Landlords lose 250
per month on each of the units still rented. The policy transfers value from entrants and
owners to incumbents.
The decisive problem is who ends up in each group. With price unable to allocate the
31,000 units, allocation happens by waiting lists, landlord selection, informal payments
and personal connections. Every one of those mechanisms favors people already in the city
with established relationships and available cash. The policy's stated aim is to keep the
city accessible to lower-income workers, and non-price rationing systematically
disadvantages exactly the newcomers and low-income entrants it is meant to protect.
The proposal's exemption for new construction is well designed and does not solve the
problem. Exempting new build for fifteen years removes the obvious disincentive to
construction, which is a genuine improvement on a blanket cap. But source B shows only
3,100 units built in five years and a four-year permit-to-occupancy period, so new supply
cannot offset a 23,000 unit shortage on any relevant timescale. The exemption limits the
damage rather than preventing it.
The alternative worth comparing is a targeted subsidy: a housing allowance paid to
households below an income threshold, letting them rent at the market price of 1,150.
Its advantages are that it does not reduce supply, since landlords still receive the
market rent, that it can be targeted by income rather than by whoever holds a lease, and
that it does not create a shortage requiring rationing.
Its disadvantages are equally real and should be stated. It costs public money where a
cap costs the budget nothing directly, the cost is visible and must be voted on annually,
and because it raises demand without raising supply, part of the subsidy is captured by
landlords through higher rents. With supply as inelastic as this data implies, that
capture could be substantial.
A second alternative is supply-side: relaxing zoning, reducing the four-year approval
timeline and funding construction directly. This addresses the actual cause, since the
underlying problem visible in the data is that 45,000 units are supplied where 62,000
would be demanded at 700 dollars. Its fatal weakness for this decision is the timescale:
four years from permit to occupancy means no relief for the households facing displacement
now, and the policy is responding to an immediate problem.
My recommendation is against the cap as proposed, and for a targeted allowance combined
with supply reform, accepting that this costs money and works more slowly. The reasoning
is that the cap achieves its distributional aim only for those who already hold a lease,
creates a shortage that grows over time, and allocates by mechanisms that disadvantage its
intended beneficiaries.
I should state what would change my view. If the elasticity of supply were much lower
than this data implies, perhaps because most units are owned by landlords with no
alternative use for the buildings, the supply loss would be smaller and the cap's case
would be considerably stronger. Evidence on what the 14,000 withdrawn units would actually
become is the single most useful thing I could obtain, and it is knowable from the
experience of comparable cities.